What would happen if the current US campaign …nance system, mostly based on private donations, were replaced by a public funding scheme of the same magnitude? It has been argued that public funding would deprive voters of useful information, but this can only be true if private donations are somehow targeted to 'better'candidates. Using a survey-based dataset about the e¤ectiveness of state legislators
Introduction
Campaign …nance regulation is a controversial topic. Supporters of stricter rules usually argue that the mixing of money and politics may cause a number of negative outcomes: politicians spend too much time fundraising, they modify their policy stance in order to attract donations, or they give preferential treatement to donors, thus skewing political outcomes in favor of the wealthy and the organized. Another charge is that campaign …nance exacerbates the incumbency advantage, which in turn makes elected leaders less accountable to voters. 1 Instead, supporters of weak or no regulation usually make use of three lines of argument: a pragmatic one (it is better to have legal campaign contributions rather than illegal ones), a constitutional one (limits on campaign …nance constitute a violation of the First Amendment on free speech), 2 and an informational one (campaign …nance is an e¤ective instrument to provide voters with useful political information). A forceful summary of the informational argument is provided by Bradley A. Smith, a commissioner with the Federal Election Commission: "[...] the fact of the matter is that, more than ever in American society, communicating in the political realm requires the expenditure of money. Money is not an evil in politics -it is a source of information to voters. E¤orts to regulate the ‡ow of money in politics over the past 20 years have done much more than money ever did to distort the political system and create a public distrust of government. It is now time to try a new approach -that is, it is time to deregulate politics. There is simply no a priori method to say what is fair or not fair -how much groups should be able to spend, or what kind of advocacy they can spend it on. The bureaucracy that has been established to regulate politics is sti ‡ing grassroots advocacy and political communication."
The informational argument in favor of campaign …nance is based upon two logical steps. First, as Bradley states, money must be "a source of information to voters."But this is not su¢ cient, because private contributions could be replaced by a system of public funding in which candidates received the same amounts, subject to the same restrictions on spending (if any), that they would have received under the private system. This shift can potentially keep the source of information to voters but it would avoid the alleged negative side e¤ects highlighted above. Many countries, especially in Europe, rely on generous public campaign …nancing. In the U.S. public …nancing plays a large role in presidential campaigns and in some states (e.g. Minnesota and New Jersey). 4 A second logical step is therefore necessary to complete the informational argument: a given amount of private contributions must be more e¤ective than the same amount of public funding in conveying information to voters. In a public system, the distribution of campaign funds among candidates could only be based on pre-determined criteria. Instead, with private contributions, the allocation of campaign money is at the discretion of donors. If donors are more likely to give money to high-quality candidates -whatever the de…nition of quality may be -then a private campaign …nance system has a potential informational advantage over a public one. If, however, private contributions do not tend to go to better candidates, then shifting to a public funding system that provides the same overall amount of money would not deprive voters of useful information.
Hence, a key question to evaluate the strength of the informational argument is: What does the amount of campaign money that a candidate receives say about that candidate's characteristics? In particular, do "better" candidates receive more money? One can also specialize the question to di¤erent classes of campaign funds. For regulatory purposes, it would be particularly interesting to know whether the informational value of campaign money varies according to the size of the donation made and to the characteristics of the donor.
To the best of our knowledge, this set of empirical questions has not yet been addressed. The vast empirical literature on campaign …nance has not attempted to estimate the informational bene…t of campaign …nance. It has mostly focused on the policy distortions caused by campaign …nance (is there a link between private contributions and policy making?) and on the electoral e¤ectiveness of campaign money (are candidates more likely to win if they receive more money?). Our empirical exercise is inspired by the theoretical literature on campaign …nance with rational voters (e.g. Potters et al. [11] , Prat [13] , [14] , Coate [4] , [5] , Gerber [6] and Ashworth [3] ). This body of work identi…es a trade-o¤ between a policy distortion and an informational bene…t, both due to the presence of private campaign …nance. In equilibrium, high-quality candidates receive more contributions than low-quality candidates, and this money is used to provide voters with information about candidates' quality. However, candidates may need to distort their policy choices (away from voters'interests) in order to attract private donations. The overall welfare e¤ect of allowing private donations depends on the relative magnitudes of the policy cost and the informational bene…t. The goal of our paper is to provide a …rst assessment of the positive side of this trade-o¤. 5 We use a dataset collected by the North Carolina Center for Public Policy Research (NC Center), which attempts to measure the "e¤ectiveness" of North Carolina state legislators. The Center asks about 500 legislators, lobbyists, and journalists to assess the e¤ectiveness of each legislator in the current legislative session. Every respondent is asked to provide a ranking of all legislators. Our data covers six electoral cycles, from 1990 to 2000. The North Carolina e¤ectiveness score can be taken to represent the consensus view of political insiders on legislators'quality. We also have information on campaign contributions for every North Carolina legislator.
We put ourselves in the shoes of North Carolina voters who are trying to evaluate the e¤ectiveness of their representatives, which we take to be proxied by the NC Center ranking. We suppose that voters do not observe the ranking directly, but they may have other kinds of information about incumbents. We consider two classes of voters and four campaign …nance information scenarios. The two classes of voters di¤er according to their knowledge of biographical and professional information about the incumbent candidates. Uninformed voters are only aware of easily observable characteristics of representatives, i.e. their gender and their party a¢ liation, while informed voters, on top of gender and party a¢ liation, also know age, race, profession, tenure of their representatives, and whether the representative belongs to the majority party and/or holds key o¢ ces in the legislature. The campaign …nance information scenarios are: (1) the voter has no information about campaign contributions; (2) the voter knows the total amount of contributions that each representative receives; (3) the voter also knows what amount comes from small contributions (less than $2,000) or large (over $2,000); (4) the voter knows the source of contributions received (candidate's own money, party money, funds from organizations, funds from individuals).
We analyze every combination of voter types and campaign …nance information scenarios, and we obtain four main results. First, the total amount of contributions that a candidate receives is a useful predictor of the candidate's e¤ectiveness ranking both for the Senate and the House, but only in the eyes of uninformed voters. However, this e¤ect is small. To increase her ranking (in the eyes of uninformed voters) by one percentage point, a House representative must spend an additional $16,000 (the median amount of contributions received by a House representative is just $24,600). The equivalent …gure is around $32,000 for a senator (median amount of contributions: $37,500). On the other hand, in the case of informed voters, the correlation between e¤ec-tiveness and total contributions received, albeit positive, is not statistically di¤erent from zero.
Second, the ability to disaggregate between small and large contributions (scenario 3) is particularly useful, for both chambers and for both classes of voters. The informational bene…t of moving from scenario 2 to 3 tends to be greater than the informational bene…t of moving from scenario 1 to 2. Small contributions are a strong positive predictor of e¤ectiveness: House representatives only need an additional $5,500 in small money to increase (again in the eyes of uninformed voters) their ranking of one percentage point. Senators only need $6,100. Instead, the striking result is that large contributions are negatively related to candidate's e¤ectiveness. This is true for both chambers and for all classes of voters. Only in the case of an uninformed voter trying to evaluate the e¤ectiveness of his House representative, is the correlation with large contributions still negative, but not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero.
Third, it is extremely useful to disaggregate total contributions according to their source (scenario 4). In particular, contributions from organizations (both pro…t and nonpro…t ones) are strongly and positively correlated with legislator e¤ectiveness. This holds for both chambers and for all classes of voters. In the eyes of uninformed voters, House representatives only need an additional $2,400 in funds from organizations in order to increase their ranking by one percentage point. The corresponding …gure for Senators amounts to $3,400. On the other hand, the e¤ectiveness of a representative in the House is negatively related to the amount of donations from party sources and from private individuals, with the former having a larger e¤ect than the latter. In general, these negative correlations are not statistically signi…cant in the case of Senators.
Fourth, the explanatory power of campaign …nance information is lower than the explanatory power of the other forms of voter information that we consider. The informational value of passing from the uninformed voter case to the informed voter case (i.e. learning about the candidate's race, age, tenure, profession, key o¢ ces held, and whether she belongs to the majority party) appears to be larger than any informational bene…t that can be gained through campaign …nance information.
The results about the size and the source of campaign funds are clari…ed by partitioning total contributions along these two classi…cation grids at the same time, i.e. by looking at small and large contributions from the four different sources mentioned above. It turns out that small contributions from organizations are strongly and positively correlated with legislator e¤ective-ness for both chambers and both classes of voters, while large contributions from organizations are positively and signi…cantly correlated with legislator e¤ectiveness only in the eyes of uninformed voters in the House. On the other hand, both small and large contributions from political parties are signi…-cantly and negatively correlated with e¤ectiveness in the case of the House, while for the Senate this holds only for large contributions. Finally, for both chambers, only large contributions from private individuals are signi…cantly and negatively correlated with legislator e¤ectiveness.
Our empirical exercise on the informativeness of campaign …nance is based on the likely unrealistic assumptions that voters are able to: (1) observe the amounts of contributions that all incumbent candidates receive, and in some cases the actual sources of these contributions; and (2) use that information e¢ ciently to make inferences about candidates'e¤ectiveness. This assumption stacks the deck in favor of an informational role for private campaign …nance. If voters only observed imperfect signals of contributions (such as the number of TV ads they see) or if they were boundedly rational in the way they process this information, then we should expect the amount of information generated by private campaign spending to be lower than under our assumptions. In this sense, our estimates should be seen as upper bounds on the informational value of private campaign …nance. 6 The main overall lesson of our exercise is that, at least according to our evidence, certain types of private funding provide no informational bene…t (and perhaps an informational cost). This is true for large contributions and for contributions from organizations, individuals, and own money. For these types of funds, there appears to be no trade-o¤ between informational bene…t and policy cost. It is hard to see why one would not want to replace these funds with public funds of the same amount.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses our data sources and Section 3 reports the results of our analysis. Section 4 relates our …ndings to the existing literature and concludes
Data

Some institutional background
The North Carolina legislature (the General Assembly) consists of two chambers: a House of Representatives with 120 members and a Senate with 50 members. All members are elected every two years, for two-year terms. The General Assembly is typically described a hybrid -a partially professional, partially amateur legislature 7 . In 2001 each member received a salary of $13,951 plus a $104 per diem for living expenses. Legislative leaders earned substantially more -e.g., the Speaker of the House was paid a salary of $38,151 together with an expense allowance of $16,956.
Regular legislative sessions are biennial and convene in January following each election. The Democratic Party dominated the North Carolina General Assembly until recently. During the 1990-1999 period Democrats held 61% of all state legislative seats. However, in 1994 Republicans won control of the state House for the …rst time in 100 years. They won again in 1996, but then lost control in 1998.
Internally, the legislature is mainly organized along party lines. The majority party controls all committee chairs 8 , but some vice-chairs and subcommittee chairs are left to the minority. Electorally, party organizations in North Carolina are stronger than in most other southern states, but still rank just below the U.S. average (see, e.g., Cotter, et al., 1984). Finally, Morehouse (1981) classi…ed North Carolina as a state in which pressure groups are strong.
Data on Legislator E¤ectiveness
As mentioned in the introduction, we take the data on legislator e¤ectiveness from the North Carolina Center for Public Policy Research (NC Center), an independent nonpro…t organization. At the end of each regular legislative session, the NC Center asks state legislators, lobbyists and legislative liaisons, and capital news correspondents to rate each member of the General Assembly according to their "e¤ectiveness". The NC Center has continuously conducted this survey since 1977. The sample of insiders being interviewed comprises all 170 legislators, all lobbyists registered in the state capital and residing in North Carolina (250-325 lobbyists), and all journalists who regularly cover the General Assembly (35-45 journalists): this amounts to a total sample size of 475-550. Every two years The NC Center publishes a handbook (Article II: A Guide to the N.C. Legislature), which contains the 7 In fact, in 1986-88 the North Carolina legislature was ranked 22nd by Squire's [15] index of legislative professionalism. 8 Apart from the question on legislator e¤ectiveness, in its survey the NC Center asks respondents to name the …ve or six "most powerful"committees in both houses. Such list almost always included Appropriations, Finance, Judiciary I, Rules, and Education (the latter one as of 1989).
ranking of legislators, as derived from these ratings.
Here follows a quote from the handbook, which well explains howaccording to the NC Center-respondents should interpret the e¤ectiveness concept: "[...] Ratings were to be based on their participation in committee work, their skill at guiding bills through ‡oor debate, their general knowledge and expertise in special …elds, the respect they command from their peers, the enthusiasm with which they execute various legislative responsibilities, the political power they hold (either by virtue of o¢ ce, longevity, or personal attributes), their ability to sway the opinion of fellow legislators, and their aptitude for the overall legislative process." (From Article II: A Guide to the 1991-1992 N.C. Legislature, p. 212.) Similarly to what done by Padró i Miquel and Snyder [10] , we invert the original ranking measure, so that higher values of our dependent variable correspond to greater e¤ectiveness. Also, in order to make results more easily comparable across the two chambers, we normalise our e¤ectiveness measure on a common 0-100 scale.
Data on campaign …nance
We match the e¤ectiveness measure with data on campaign …nance contributions received by legislators running for reelection to the General Assembly. Such data comes from the North Carolina State Board of Elections 9 . Here, detailed pieces of information regarding contributions received by candidates running for the General Assembly are available in electronic format, beginning with the 1990 elections.
We aggregate this data to create a set of campaign …nance …gures for each candidate in each election year. All …gures are in real terms, i.e. they are translated into 2000 dollars. First, we calculate the total amount of contributions received by candidate j in election t. To provide a cleaner measure of this, which should be independent of the timing of received contributions, we exclude all bank transactions from the computation, in particular interest rate payments.
Second, we calculate the total amounts of contributions which are respectively above and below a …xed threshold of $2,000 10 . When doing this, we take into account the fact that some contributors may in fact donate in separate installments: if the total amount donated to candidate j by contributor i for election t is above the threshold, our procedure classi…es this as a large contribution, even if each installment, separately considered, is below the $2,000 threshold.
Third, we distinguish total campaign …nance contributions according to their source. We consider four categories of donors: the candidate herself, her political party, organizations (both pro…t and nonpro…t ones) and individuals. Table 1 presents some summary statistics about this campaign …nance data. We separately show …gures about the Lower House and the Senate. As we are matching campaign …nance data with information on legislator e¤ectiveness, the tables refer to incumbent candidates, i.e. those for which an e¤ectiveness score is available. In all cases (total contributions, small and large contributions, total contributions classi…ed according to the source) and for both chambers the distribution of funds received by candidates is positively skewed, as witnessed by the fact that for each category the average contribution is larger than the median one. The median amount of total contributions to an incumbent candidate in the House is about $24,600, while the average one is about $47,000. The median sum of contributions received by an incumbent candidate in the Senate is slightly below $37,500, with the average one almost reaching $77,000.
Other data
When constructing the information set enjoyed by di¤erent class of voters, we make use of data on gender, age, race, party a¢ liation, tenure of incumbent legislators, and key o¢ ces held by them. These pieces of information are taken from the NC Center's Article II guides and various editions of the North Carolina Manual. In particular, the tenure variable is de…ned as the number of terms a given representative has continuously served in the House or Senate. The count restarts in case a representative switches from the Lower House to the Senate (or vice versa).
We use an ordinal variable to measure the relevance of the posts held by a candidate in the current legislature. This variable takes on a value of …ve if the representative is Speaker or Speaker pro tempore, a value of four if she is President pro tempore or Majority Leader, three if she is Minority Leader, two if she is Majority or Minority Whip, one if she is chair of some top committee, and zero otherwise.
Results
We analyze both chambers of the North Carolina State Assembly. The basic speci…cation is as follows:
where R jt is the normalised e¤ectiveness ranking given to the incumbent candidate j at time t (regarding her performance during the past legislature), x jt is a vector of candidate characteristics that possibly vary across time, j is an individual e¤ect and jt is an idiosyncratic error. The focus of our analysis is on c jt , which is a vector containing information on contributions received by candidate j during the electoral campaign taking place at time t. We consider four di¤erent scenarios regarding the campaign …nance information available to voters:
1. No information about campaign contributions;
2. Total amount of contributions received by each representative;
3. Total amount of small contributions (less than $2,000) and total amount of large contributions (at least $2,000);
4. Total amount of contributions disagreggated by source (own money, party funds, funds from organizations, all other contributions).
The exact form of the c jt vector varies across these scenarios. Our results, based on a random e¤ects speci…cation, are shown in Tables  2 and 3. Table 2 corresponds to the case of an uninformed voter -i.e. a voter who observes only gender and party a¢ liation of representatives. Table 3 is for the case of an informed voter -i.e. one who observes what the uninformed type knows, plus age, race, profession 11 , tenure, key o¢ ces held in the past legislature, and whether the representative's party had the majority. In both tables we present estimates for both the Lower House and the Senate.
Rather than discussing each regression individually, it is more instructive to compare the role of the same variables across treatments. First, consider the coe¢ cient on total campaign contributions in Scenario 2. For both chambers and both classes of voters, the estimated coe¢ cient is positive. However, its strength decreases when voters become more informed. It is also lower for the Senate. For informed voters in both chambers, the coe¢ cient is not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero.
The estimates imply that an increase of $1,000 in the campaign chest of a House representative would lead uninformed voters to predict an increase of 0.062 percentage points in her ranking. Put di¤erently, a House representative who wishes to go up one percentage point in the ranking of uninformed voters must …nd an additional $1;000 0:062 = $16; 100. To put this in perspective, the median amount of contributions received by a House representative is $24,600. The equivalent …gure for a senator is $32,250 (and the median contribution amount is $37,500).
When we move to scenario 3, the coe¢ cient on small money is signi…cant at the 1% level for both classes of voters and for both chambers. As before, its estimate is higher for uninformed voters and for the House. Now, money is much more informative than in scenario 2. A House representative who wishes to go up a percentage point in the ranking of uninformed voters must …nd only an additional $5,500 in small money (the median amount of small money received by a House representative is $21,000). The equivalent …gure for a senator is $6,100 (median amount of small money: $32,000). Even in the case of informed voters is the magnitude of the correlation sizeable: in order to increase her e¤ectiveness ranking by one percentage point, a House representative needs an additional $9,200 in small money, while a Senator would need almost the same amount, i.e. $9,500.
Instead, the coe¢ cient on large money is negative (and signi…cant for all cases except uninformed voters in the House). The point estimate of the amount of large money needed to make the ranking of a representative go down of a percentage point ranges from $12,000 (for an uninformed voter in the Senate) to $23,800 (for an informed voter in the House).
In scenario 4, there is a strong and positive correlation between the ranking measure and the amount of funds from organizations. Such correlation is statistically signi…cant at the 1% level for all class of voters and both chambers, and the estimated coe¢ cient is large in magnitude. If one focuses on uninformed voters, it is su¢ cient for a House representative to raise an additional $2,400 in funds from organizations in order to increase her ranking by one percentage point (the median amount of funds from organizations received by House representatives is $13,000). The corresponding …gure for a Senator is $3,400 (median amount of organizations'money: $19,800). Even in the case of an informed voter is the correlation estimated to be large: the necessary increase in organizations'funds to obtain a percentage point increase in the e¤ectiveness ranking amounts to $5,700 and $6,000, in the House and in the Senate respectively.
Party funds are signi…cantly and negatively correlated with legislator effectiveness for both classes of voters in the Lower House, while such correlation is mildly statistically signi…cant for uninformed voters in the Senate. The point estimate of the amount of party funds needed to make the ranking of a House representative go down of a percentage point ranges from $3,000 (uninformed voters) to $5,600 (informed ones). Similarly, contributions from individuals are signi…cantly and negatively correlated with legislator e¤ec-tiveness for both classes of voters in the House, while the correlation, albeit negative, is never statistically signi…cant in the case of Senators. The size of the correlation is smaller than the one found for party money: in the eyes of uninformed voters, the amount of private individuals'money needed to decrease the ranking of a House representative by one percentage point amounts to $19,200 12 . Finally, the coe¢ cients on own funds are not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero in any of the four cases being studied.
A clear pattern has emerged. Total contributions have a mild positive relation with e¤ectiveness, which is the composition of two e¤ects with opposite signs. Small contributions have a strong positive e¤ect, while large contributions have a negative e¤ect. The mild positive relation of total contributions with e¤ectiveness can be also analysed by looking at the partition of funds according to the source: funds from organizations are strongly and positively correlated with the e¤ectiveness measure, while funds from political parties and private individuals are negatively correlated, signi…cantly so for the House.
How much information on e¤ectiveness do voters gain when they have campaign …nance information? Table 4 reports 16 R-squared values (the …gures written in large, regular characters) corresponding to the two classes of voters and four campaign …nance information scenarios for the House and for the Senate. Obviously, the (unadjusted) R-square coe¢ cient increases when one adds information, either by looking at a more informed class of voters within the same scenario or by examining a more informative scenario for the same class of voters. It must be however noted that scenario 3 is not nested within scenario 4; on the other hand, scenario 2 is nested within both scenario 3 and 4 (which correspond to alternative partitions of total contributions received by candidates).
Every shift downwards or rightwards in Table 5 corresponds to adding one or more right-hand variables to the previous regression, again with the exception of the move from scenario 3 to scenario 4. Hence, it is possible to perform an F-test between each pair of neighboring cells, and between scenario 2 and scenario 4. The …gures written in small italic font correspond to P-values for the F-statistics computed for a pair of neighboring cells. For example, look at informed voters in the Senate and compare scenario 2 (R 2 = 52:49%) and scenario 3 (R 2 = 55:29%). The P-value of the Fstatistics is 0.001. Regarding the P-values on the left of scenario 4, they correspond to the F-tests between scenario 2 and 4. Table 4 highlights several patterns. Firstly, moving between the two classes of voters is, in general, more useful from an informational viewpoint than moving between campaign …nance information scenarios. All 8 F-statistics for vertical comparisons are highly signi…cant, while some of the 12 F-statistics for horizontal comparisons are not. The most powerful informational treatment appears to be the shift from uninformed to informed voters. This is particularly striking in the House, where in scenario 1, the R-squared for uninformed voters is 3:57% while that for informed voters is 43:53%. Campaign …nance information can make up for only a small fraction of this gap: the R-squared for uninformed voters in scenario 4 is 20:89%. The patterns are similar in the Senate, but less pronouced. These …ndings put an upper bound to the importance of campaign …nance as an informational channel.
When we focus on horizontal comparisons, we notice that the di¤erence between scenarios 2 and 3 is always signi…cant at the 1% level. The di¤erence between scenarios 2 and 4 is always statistically signi…cant, at the 1% level for both classes of voters in the House and uninformed ones in the Senate; it is signi…cant at 5% level for informed voters in the Senate. Instead, the di¤erence between scenarios 1 and 2 is not signi…cant for informed voters in both chambers.
To sum up, the overall picture emerging from Table 4 is: (1) campaign …nance information is useful, but less so than other (basic) types of information; and (2) the most informative part of campaign …nance is the disaggregation of total contributions according to the size and the source. Tables 2, 3 and 4 are based upon a random e¤ects speci…cation. Tables  6 and 7 show results for uninformed and informed voters respectively (i.e. they parallel Tables 2 and 3 ), but adopt a …xed e¤ects design. The signs and signi…cance levels of coe¢ cients are broadly similar across the two designs. 13 In addition, we examined the purely cross-sectional variation in the data using the "between"estimator, and …nd similar patterns but with even larger coe¢ cients. In the interest of space we do not report these results, but they are available upon request.
Size and source of contributions compared
As discussed above, the partition of total contributions according to size and source gives voters a valuable amount of information about legislator e¤ectiveness. Two related questions stem from this …nding:
1. What is the relationship between the results about the size of contributions (scenario 3) and the ones about the source thereof (scenario 4)?
2. Which of the two partitions provides voters with "more" information about the unobserved ranking of legislators?
In order to answer these questions, we classify total contributions according to the size and the source at the same time (i.e. we obtain eight campaign contributions …gures for each incumbent candidate in each year).
Again considering both classes of voters and both chambers, we re-run the regressions with this new scenario about campaign …nance information. Results are presented in Table 5 , where each column corresponds to a di¤erent class of voters in the Lower House and in the Senate.
A consistent pattern emerges here, which helps explain the results regarding scenario 3 and scenario 4. Firstly, small contributions from organizations are strongly and positively correlated with legislator e¤ectiveness. For both classes of voters in the House and for uninformed ones in the Senate the coe¢ cients are signi…cantly di¤erent from zero at the 1% level, and the size of the e¤ect is remarkably large. An incumbent candidate in the House, who wants to increase her ranking by one percentage point in the eyes of uninformed voters, needs only an additional $1,800 of small contributions from organizations. An additional $3,800 is needed to achieve the same one percentage point increase in the ranking if one considers the perception of informed voters. Regarding the Senate, the needed increase in small money from organizations ranges from $3,100 (uninformed voters) to about $7,500 (informed ones). In fact, large contributions from organizations are significantly (and positively) correlated with legislator e¤ectiveness -at the 10% level-only for uninformed voters in the House.
Turning to the other contribution sources, we …nd that in the House both small and large funds from political parties are negatively related to legislator e¤ectiveness, and signi…cant at the 5% level or better. The magnitude of the e¤ect is pretty large: in the case of uninformed voters, a one percentage point increase in the e¤ectiveness ranking would be achieved by a reduction of $1,400 in small party contributions. On the other hand, only large contributions from individuals are signi…cantly (and negatively) correlated with the ranking measure.
In the Senate, only large contributions from political parties are signi…-cantly correlated with legislator e¤ectiveness, with a negative sign. The fact that in the Senate contributions from private individuals are not signi…cantly correlated with legislator e¤ectiveness …nds an explanation when looking at the double partition according to size and source. Indeed, large contributions from private individuals are negatively and signi…cantly correlated with our measure of quality, while small contributions from the same type of source are positively and signi…cantly correlated with e¤ectiveness.
Which partition of total contributions is more valuable to voters from an informational standpoint? We answer this question by performing two separate batteries of F-tests and reporting the associated P-values in Table 5 . Firstly we test the hypothesis that the coe¢ cients of all sources of small and large contributions respectively are statistically the same, i.e. they vary according to the contribution size and not according to the source. Secondly we test whether the partial correlations (with legislator e¤ectiveness) of the di¤erent sources of funds do not depend on the size thereof. In the case of the Lower House, both the size and the source partition of total contributions convey valuable information to voters, as witnessed by the small P-values of the four F-tests. In the Senate as well both size and source of contributions convey valuable information, even though the P-values of the F-tests are sistematically larger than in the House.
Discussion and conclusions
One of the main challenges in the theoretical campaign …nance literature is to provide a convincing theory of why and how campaign spending in ‡uences voting decisions (see Prat [12] for a survey). Why should a voter be more likely to vote for a candidate who spends more money? There are two main strands of literature, both of them built on an informational story.
Some authors (Potters et al. [11] , Prat [13] , [14] ) focus on the signalling role of campaign …nance. For instance, Prat [13] assumes that candidates are characterized by a non-directly observable quality parameter. First, lobbies receive a signal about candidates' quality and choose how much money to contribute. Later, voters may observe a signal about candidate quality as well. In equilibrium, lobbies are more willing to contribute to a candidate associated to a positive signal, because voters are likely to receive a positive signal as well. But then, in equilibrium the amount of money that a candidate receives reveals the lobbies'view about that candidate's quality. A rational voter is more likely to cast her ballot in favor of a candidate who receives a large amount of contributions. 14 The …rst approach is based on the idea that lobbies' signals are nonveri…able. The only credible way to transmit them to voters is by money burning. Other authors (Coate [4] , [5] and Ashworth [3] ) instead note that certain types of information, such as the candidate's record or characteristics, are veri…able. A candidate can make voters aware of his veri…able attributes (or his opponent's attributes) through advertising. Candidates with positive veri…able characteristics stand to gain from advertising and are more willing and able to receive money from lobbies. This approach also entails a potential policy distortion due to the candidates'desire to secure contributions.
Both classes of models predict that in equilibrium higher-quality candidates will receive more money than low-quality candidates. Hence, our exercise can be seen as a reduced-form exploration of this key prediction.
Could we distinguish between these two informative-advertising approaches? In the second approach, campaign spending conveys information only about veri…able candidate characteristics. Hence, if one controls for all relevant, observable characteristics, there should be no remaining correlation between candidate expenditure and candidate quality. In our case, this means that the coe¢ cient of a regression of legislator e¤ectiveness over campaign receipts should be zero for an informed voter. This is indeed the case for the overall amount of contributions. However, our data also reveal that the coe¢ cient on contributions is positive and signi…cant, even when voters are highly informed, for certain sources of contributions. This seems to indicate that the potential information that can be communicated is not limited to the observable characteristics that we consider. 15 In terms of the existing empirical literature, there are three main features of candidates that have been found to be correlated with the amount and pattern of campaign contributions received: incumbency, institutional power and legislative entrepeneurship.
First, an important and well-known regularity is that incumbent candidates on average receive more campaign contributions than challengers (see Jacobson [7] ). This fact is typically coupled with the …nding that the correlation between contributions received and electoral success is positive, 15 A recent paper by Vanberg [16] studies, both theoretically and empirically, the opportunity of capping the size of the contribution that an individual can make. Every candidate is assumed to be characterized by a two-dimensional type: one dimension is veri…able and the other is not. On the unveri…able dimension, there is a con ‡ict of interest between voters and a lobby. It is then shown that a candidate who receives large contributions is more likely to have negative hidden characteristics. The model predicts that candidates that rely on large contributions (controlling for the total amount of contributions they receive) have less electoral success. However, data on the US House of Representatives from 1990 to 2002 indicate no evidence of such a negative relation.
Vanberg's set-up is consistent with our observation that small money is positively correlated with e¤ectiveness and large money is negatively correlated. signi…cant and robust for challengers only 16 . Second, regarding incumbents, Ansolabehere and Snyder [2] use PAC contributions as a metric of institutional power, both between di¤erent political institutions and between members of the same institution. The idea is that interest groups, di¤erently from other groups of donors, primarily act as investors when …nancing politicians'campaigns, as they expect services and/or policies in exchange for their contributions. Hence interest groups would tend to donate more to politicians that have greater in ‡uence over the process (possibly) leading to the approval and enactment of these desired policies and services. They …nd for example that incumbents in the U.S. House systematically receive more PAC contributions when moving onto powerful committes like Ways and Means or Energy and Commerce. Our …ndings -in particular, the positive correlation between organizations'donations and legislator e¤ectiveness -are consistent with their results.
Third, Wawro [17] analyses the link between PAC contributions and legislative "entrepeneurship" in the U.S. House. He de…nes an index of entrepeneurship using bill sponsorship and co-sponsorship behavior. He …nds no statistically signi…cant relationship between this index and the total amount of PAC contributions received by a representative. In contrast, we …nd a strong and positive relationship between incumbents'e¤ectiveness and campaign funds from organizations. How can we reconcile these two sets of results? One possible explanation is that the index used by Wawro is a quite noisy measure of legislator quality. Another possibility is that there is much less variation in quality across incumbents in the U.S. House than in the North Carolina General Assembly. This is plausible because the U.S. House is a highly professional legislature, while the NC General Assembly is not.
While the variation across incumbents in the U.S. House might be small, scholars typically argue that the variance in quality across non-incumbents is large. Interestingly, when we look at non-incumbents for the U.S. House, we see a strong relationship between contributions received and their quality, as proxied for example by their previous o¢ ceholding. Averaging over the period 1978-1998, non-incumbents who held previous o¢ ce (either as state legislators or statewide executive o¢ cers) received more than twice as much in total contributions as those who did not. The di¤erence is even starkera three to one ratio -if one considers PAC contributions only. 16 See Jacobson [8] . 17 In 1992 dollars non-incumbents with previous o¢ ceholding received on average How do our …ndings relate to the informational argument invoked by opponents of campaign …nance regulation? The amount of money that a candidate receives appears to be increasing in positive personal characteristics of the candidate, even though this e¤ect is quite small. Hence, the informational argument appears to be valid but weak. However, more importantly, our results indicate that the informational bene…ts are mostly due to small contributions, and contributions from organizations, if one considers the partition according to the source. Large contributions are a confounding factor, since they are negatively correlated with candidate quality. This is also true for funds from political parties and private individuals, at least in the Lower House, and large contributions from parties and individuals in the Senate. 18 Since most of the restrictions on campaign donations that have been introduced or proposed in the U.S. mainly apply to large contributions, our …ndings put into question the validity of the informational argument as a serious objection to such restrictions. On the basis of our analysis, it is quite di¢ cult to argue that replacing large contributions with state funds -which are assigned according to pre-determined criteria-would deprive voters of useful information. If anything, eliminating the noise created by large contributions could increase the informative value of small ones.
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How can one interpret the results about the di¤erent sources of contributions? One possibility is that the organizations donating small funds to candidates know approximatively as much about these candidates as the group of political insiders interviewed by the NC Center. Regarding the negative correlation of (large) party funds with legislator e¤ectiveness, one $460,000 in total contributions, as compared to an average of $240,000 for nono¢ ceholders. The corresponding …gures for PAC contributions are $130,000 and $40,000. Jacobson [7] reports similarly large di¤erences for the 1972 to 1978 period. 18 Moreover, it is small contributions from organizations that drive the positive correlation of interest group money with legislator e¤ectiveness. Large contributions from organizations are positively and signi…cantly correlated with legislator e¤ectiveness only in the case of uninformed voters in the Lower House.
19 Also, from the North Carolina taxpayer's point of view, public funding of state legislative campaigns would not be terribly expensive. In 2000, the total amounts of large contributions accruing to candidates in the Lower House and in the Senate were around $5,600,000 and $4,500,000 respectively. The corresponding …gures for total contributions were $12,000,000 and $9,000,000. Since North Carolina total personal income in 2000 was $218,668 million (BEA …gure), replacing large contributions with public funds would cost less than 0.005% of total personal income. Replacing all private contributions would still cost less than 0.01% of personal income. plausible explanation is the following: in order to win as many seats as possible, political parties help their weaker candidates -i.e. those who have low e¤ectiveness rankings and are unable to raise enough money from alternative sources -transferring additional funds to them. The negative correlation of funds from private individuals, and especially large ones, does not immediately …nd an intuitive political economy explanation 20 . We already highlighted the limitations of our approach in the introduction. Given these caveats, a natural question arising here is to what extent our …ndings about the relationship between campaign …nance and legislator e¤ectiveness in the North Carolina legislature would apply to other legislative bodies. Our conjecture is that other partially professional, partially amateur state legislatures could display the same type of correlations, with the pattern of campaign money being capable of discriminating professional incumbents from amateur ones. We are less sure about the applicability of these results to more thoroughly professional state legislatures (e.g. California or New York). As we noted above, our analysis might apply to non-incumbent candidates for the U.S. Congress. By extension, it might also apply to nonincumbents in professional legislatures. Regarding incumbents, the pattern of contributions -classi…ed according to size and/or source -might provide voters with relevant informational cues about legislator e¤ectiveness even in professional legislatures. 
55.78
Notes: rows correspond to the three different informational scenarios, while columns refer to information about campaign finance. Overall R squared are reported on the junctions between rows and columns. P-values of the F-tests between one scenario and the other are reported in italics in the relevant cell. E.g., in the row about informed voters for the Senate, consider the figure in between the "no money" and the "total contributions" columns. The figure is 0.439: this is the P-value for the test that the coefficient on total contributions is equal to zero. The only exception is with the P-values on the left of scenario [4] , which are referred to the F-tests between scenario [2] and [4] , just because scenario [3] is not nested into scenario [4] . Notes: random effects regressions, with normalised legislative effectiveness as dependent variable. Standard errors in brackets. *** indicates that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1% level. ** (*) indicates 5% (10%) significance. The first F-test whose P-values is reported has as its null hypothesis that the coefficients of different sources of funds are the same, separately considering small and large contributions. The null hypothesis of the second F-test is that the correlation of the different sources of funds does not depend on their size. 
